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Over the last few years, the international legal community has become increas-
ingly interested in anti-arbitration injunctions, which are analogous to anti-
suit injunctions except that the former prohibits the initiation or continuation
of an arbitration while the latter focuses on judicial actions.' At this point, very
few courts have actually issued an injunction of this type.2 Nevertheless, a
number of commentators have expressed concern about these mechanisms,
since they can wreak havoc with contractual or treaty-based expectations
about how a particular dispute is to be resolved. Indeed, some scholars and
practitioners would prefer that these sorts of injunctions be made universally
Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge; D.Phil., University of Oxford; J.D., Duke University;
M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The author,
who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in
England and Wales, is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and Senior
Fellow at the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution.
i See Emmanuel Gaillard, 'Reflections on the Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International
Arbitration' in LA. Mistelis and J.D.M. Lew (eds.), Pervasive Problems in InternationalArbitration
(Kluwer 20o8) 203 paras. 10-19 to 10-21; Julian D.M. Lew, 'Does National Court Involvement
Undermine the International Arbitration Process?' (2009) a4Am U Int'lL Rev. 489, 5oo-5o9.
2 See s.i . Strong, International CommercialArbitration: A Guidefor u. s. Judges (Federal Judicial
Center 2o12) 44.
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unavailable. However, other people believe that there are times when a court
may enjoin arbitral procedures without damaging any of the core principles of
arbitration law and practice.3
Theoretical debates about the relative merits of anti-arbitration injunctions
will likely continue for years. However, the more practical question is whether
and to what extent courts are currently willing and able to grant orders prohib-
iting international arbitrations from proceeding. Interestingly, the Caribbean
Court of Justice (ccj) has recently addressed precisely this issue in British
Caribbean Bank Ltd v. The Government of Belize.
British Caribbean Bank involved an appeal to the ccj from an interlocutory
order of the Court of Appeal of Belize restraining British Caribbean Bank Ltd.
(BCB) from pursuing an arbitration based on a bilateral investment treaty
(BIT) between Belize and the United Kingdom (para. 2). In addition to original
jurisdiction over a limited number of matters, the ccj has taken over the
appellate function formerly exercised by the Privy Council with respect to cer-
tain member states of the Caribbean Community and Common Market
(CARICOM ).4 The ccj's appellate jurisdiction includes "all the jurisdiction and
powers possessed in relation to that case by the Court of Appeal of the
Contracting Party from which the appeal was brought" 5
The substantive dispute between the parties arose in 2009, when the
Government of Belize nationalized the country's telecommunications indus-
try (para. 4). As part of that process, the government compulsorily acquired
certain loan and mortgage debenture facilities held by BCB (para. 2). Although
3 For example, an anti-arbitration injunction may be appropriate if a party initiates arbitral
proceedings in the wrong place or with the wrong institution. Injunctive relief may also
be considered either useful or necessary if an arbitration is begun in the absence of a
valid arbitration agreement. Purists, however, would argue that parties who believe an arbi-
tration has been improperly initiated should raise the appropriate defences in the arbitration
itself.
4 See <www.caribbeancourtoljustice.org> (io December 2013); see also Agreement Establishing
the Caribbean Court ofjustice, para. XXV, 14 February 2001 [hereinafter ccj Agreement] <www
.caribbeancourtofustice.org/wp-content/uploads/20n/og/ccj agreement.pdf> (1o December
2013). At this point, the ccj has appellate jurisdiction over Barbados, Belize and Guyana, with
Dominica shortly to join the group. See Dominica Informs Privy Council of Intention to Join
Caribbean Court ofJustice, CARIBBEAN 360, 27 November 2013 <www.caribbean36o.com/index
.php/news/dominica news/io86831.html#axzz2mGQeUCjn> (0o December 2013).
5 ccj Agreement, supra note 4, para. XXV(6).
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the instruments had a face value of us$24 million, payment of both principal
and interest ceased at the time of the compulsory acquisition, and BCB
received no other form of compensation (para. 4).
The legislation authorizing the initial acquisition was held unconstitutional
in 2011, but the Government of Belize subsequently took a number of steps,
including the enactment of a constitutional amendment, to reacquire the tele-
communications properties in question (para. 5). The constitutionality of
these actions has also been challenged (para. 5), and a variety of other domes-
tic proceedings have also been initiated by either the Government of Belize or
BCB (paras. 6, 8, 42-44, 48, 50).
The BIT arbitration that is at the centre of the current dispute was initiated
on 5 May 2010 (para. 3).6 That same day, the Government of Belize sought an
interim injunction from the national courts prohibiting BCB "from taking any
or any further steps in the continuation or prosecution of the arbitration pro-
ceedings" (para. io). After considering the matter, the trial court issued the
injunction, based on the judge's belief that "resolution of the disputes through
the domestic courts was preferable" to investment arbitration (para. ii). That
injunction was to remain in place until the related domestic cases had run
their course (para. 11).
BCB subsequently appealed, and a majority of the Court of Appeal upheld
the injunction, though on slightly different grounds than the trial court
(para. 12). 7 The Court of Appeal also altered the timeframe of the injunction,
holding that the order should only remain in place until "the date of trial of the
merits of the substantive application for a (permanent) injunction" (para. 12).
BCB again appealed, this time to the ccj. By this point, the dispute had been
narrowed to three main issues. First, the ccj was asked to determine
"[w]hether the BIT provided BCB with an unqualified or indefeasible right to
proceed to international arbitration" (para. 13). Although proponents of a
strong view of investment arbitration might answer this question in the posi-
tive, courts seldom find an absolute restraint on their own power. Thus, it is
unsurprising that the ccj answered this question in the negative, holding that
"[t]he exercise by one individual of his or her rights often infringes on the
6 A tribunal has been named, although Belize did not participate in the process. See British
Caribbean Bank, para. 7.
7 At the time the Court of Appeal heard the current matter, the statute authorizing anti-
arbitration injunctions had been held unconstitutional by a lower court. SeeBritish Caribbean
Bank, para. 31. However, by the time the ccj heard the current dispute, the Court of Appeal
had held that the anti-arbitration statute was constitutional. See ibid, paras. 31-32 (discuss-
ing Zuniga v. Attorney General of Belize).
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rights of other individuals or the society as a whole and the courts are and
must remain the final arbiter of the relative distribution of those rights"
(para. 14).
The second issue was largely procedural in nature. Here, the ccj was asked
to determine "[w]hether, if there was a power to restrain the arbitral process,
the Court should make a determination of the merits of the claim for a perma-
nent injunction or should limit its enquiry and determine only whether there
was a serious issue to be tried" (para. 13). Because "all the relevant materials
were before [the court] without any complex issues of facts to be resolved," the
ccj decided that "the court below ought to have decided whether it was just
and convenient to uphold the injunction" permanently, not just on an interim
basis (para. 28). Although this analysis may yield a different outcome on differ-
ent facts, observers should appreciate the ccj's willingness to allow an early
and conclusive determination of the propriety of an anti-arbitration injunc-
tion in appropriate circumstances, since the uncertain nature of interlocutory
orders often creates a hardship on the parties.
Third, the ccj was asked to consider "[w]hether ... there was any or any suf-
ficient basis, for the grant of the injunction to restrain the arbitration"
(para. 13). This question involved a de novo inquiry into whether a permanent
injunction was justified on the facts presented to the court. After rigorous con-
sideration of a variety of relevant factors, the ccj ultimately decided that such
an injunction was not proper, particularly in light of BCB'S willingness to give
an undertaking to suspend certain domestic proceedings so as to ensure that
there would be no double recovery (para. 50). As a result, the ccj discharged
the injunction, thereby allowing the BIT arbitration to go forward (para. 56).
The ccJ's judgment is largely well-reasoned, and the Court of Appeal in Belize
has subsequently relied on the decision to discharge two anti-arbitration injunc-
tions that were pending in an unrelated matter.8 However, there are some aspects
of the ccj's analysis that may be potentially problematic going forward. The key
features of the decision to be discussed in more detail are the limited, yet exis-
tent, ability of domestic courts to issue anti-suit injunctions, contract analogies
drawn by the Court and the Court's understanding of investment arbitration.9
8 See Dunked Int'l Investment Ltd v. Attorney General of Belize, paras. 7, 130-46, Civ App No.
24/2011, Court of Appeal (1 November 2013).
9 The ccJ discusses a number of additional matters that may prove useful to courts, commen-
tators and counsel, even though those concerns fall outside the scope of this brief comment.
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The Limited But Undeniable Ability to Issue Anti-Arbitration
Injunctions
Although some people would like to see anti-arbitration injunctions prohib-
ited in their entirety, the ccj was clearly of the view that it had the power to
enjoin an arbitral proceeding, even if an injunction was not appropriate on the
facts presented in the instant case (para. 14). ° When considering the source of
its authority, the ccj focused primarily on section io6A(8) of the Supreme
Court of Judicature Act, which states that
[w]ithout prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the
Court shall have jurisdiction
(i) to issue an injunction against a party or arbitrators (or both)
restraining them from commencing or continuing any arbitral pro-
ceedings (whether sited in Belize or abroad), or an injunction
against a part [sic] restraining it form [sic] commencing or con-
tinuing any proceedings for enforcement of an arbitral award
(whether in Belize or abroad), where it is shown (in either case)
that such proceedings are or would be oppressive, vexatious, ineq-
uitable or would constitute an abuse of the legal or arbitral
process;
(ii) to void and vacate an award made by an arbitral tribunal (whether in
Belize or abroad) in disregard of or contrary to any such injunction."
The ccj then undertook a detailed analysis of the facts of the dispute before
finding that the investment arbitration in question was not "oppressive, vexa-
tious, inequitable or ... an abuse of the legal or arbitral process" within the
meaning of the statute.' 2
Although the ccj's discussion of the statutory standard is in many ways use-
ful, an action challenging the constitutionality of section lo6A(8) is currently
pending in the ccj, so it is possible that certain aspects of the analysis could
For example, the decision addresses issues relating to the possible need for exhaustion of
local remedies, British Caribbean Bank, paras. 21-23; the distinction between claims aris-
ing under the treaty and under domestic law, ibicL, paras. 46-47; questions of double
recovery and inconsistent judgments, ibiL, paras. 47, 52, 54; and the undertaking of BCB,
ibi, paras. 50-54.
10 See also Lew, supra note i, pp. 509-514.
11 Supreme Court ofJudicature Act §io6A(8), as quoted in British Caribbean Bank, para. 30.
12 Ibid
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become moot at some point.13 The dubious constitutionality of section io6A(8)
might also lead those who oppose anti-arbitration injunctions to wonder
whether it is possible that this particular device might be eliminated from the
array of available remedies in Belize.
While it is unclear whether this particular piece of legislation will pass con-
stitutional muster, it is highly unlikely that the ccj or Belizean judiciary will
ever find themselves without the ability to enjoin arbitral proceedings, given
the ccj's statement that courts must retain the power to balance the rights of
individuals and society at large (para. 14). Indeed, when the Court of Appeal
temporarily found itself without statutory authority for an anti-arbitration
injunction in the instant case, the court simply based its actions on the com-
mon law and equity (para. 31).
Although the Belizean courts have the power to enjoin arbitral proceedings,
this is not to say that such injunctions will become commonplace. Indeed, the
courts of Belize have "a long history ofjudicial self-denial" in arbitral matters, 14
and "it is 'only with extreme hesitation' that the court will interfere with the
process of arbitration" (para. 38).
When discussing when an injunction might be proper, the ccj invoked the
test enunciated by the High Court of England and Wales in Elektrim SA v.
Vivendi Universal S.A. (para. 39).15 Thus,
[a] party is ... at liberty to challenge the validity of the arbitration contract
or the agreement of which the arbitration contract is an integral and
non-severable part. But once the validity of the arbitration bargain has
been established the court will only grant an injunction to restrain the
arbitration if it is positively shown that the arbitration proceedings would
be oppressive, vexatious, inequitable, or an abuse of process. The burden
is on the party seeking the injunction and he must discharge that burden
to a higher level than that required to restrain foreign proceedings which
do not involve a contract to litigate in the foreign court (para. 41).
Regardless of whether the court is applying section lo6A(8) or the common
law, the standard is quite high, since "the jurisdiction to grant an anti-
arbitration injunction must be exercised with caution" (para. 40; see also ibid,
para. 32). Indeed,
13 See British Caribbean Bank, para. 31 (discussing Zuniga v. Attorney General of Belize).
14 Attorney Generat of Belize v. Carlisle Holdings Ltd (Belize), Action No.15 Of 2005, 18 February
2005, Supreme Court of Belize, (2oo8) XXXIII Y.B. Com. Arb. 360,363 para. 3.
15 See also Elektrim SA v. Vivendi Universal SA [2007] EWHC 571 (Comm.).
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the court must re-double the caution it normally exercises in restraining
foreign proceedings because of the importance of recognizing and
enforcing the agreement of parties to the mechanism for dispute resolu-
tion and the accepted principle of international law that the arbitral tri-
bunal should not be subject to the control of the domestic courts before
it makes an award (para. 41).
The ccj also identified a number of other salient features. For example, "there
is no presumption that the pursuit of multiple proceedings is vexatious or
oppressive or an abuse of process in itself, nor is there vexation or oppression
if there is an advantage to the party seeking the arbitral proceeding" (para. 40).
Furthermore, "[t]he equitable basis of the jurisdiction makes it a remedy based
on the wrongful conduct of the person to be restrained" (para. 41).
The extraordinary nature of an anti-arbitration injunction will likely make
the mechanism slightly more palatable to those persons who find such mea-
sures troubling as a matter of law or practice. However, the methodology
employed by the ccj does create some potential problems, as described in the
next subsection.
Contract Analogies
When describing the standards to be used in cases involving anti-arbitration
injunctions, the ccj refers to "arbitration contracts" on several occasions
(paras. 39-41, 47). Given that the arbitral proceedings in the current dispute
arise out of a treaty, these statements might be assumed to refer exclusively to
the test enunciated in Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi Universal S.A., which involved
private, contract-based arbitral proceedings.' 6 However, other parts of the
decision suggest that the ccj considers international investment arbitration to
be akin to contract-based arbitration. For example, the ccj states that
[t]he constitution of the agreement to arbitrate from the terms of the
investment treaty is not unlike making a contract from an advertisement
containing certain terms to get a reward. Such an advertisement consti-
tutes a binding unilateral offer that can be accepted by anyone who per-
forms its terms: Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (para. 2o). 17
16 See Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi Universal S.A. [2007] EWHC 571 (Comm.); see also British
Caribbean Bank, paras. 39-40.
17 Citing Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1891-941 All ER Rep l27.
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In this case, "BC B, the investor,.., makes a free standing offer which is accepted
on submission of the dispute to arbitration and becomes a binding contract
between the investor and the State party" (para. 21). As a result, "[t]he entire
scheme of the BIT is contractual" (para. 47).
This approach is troubling for two reasons. First, it characterizes the inves-
tor as the offeror and puts the state in the place of the offeree, thereby revers-
ing the conventional view of investment arbitration as involving a standing
offer of arbitration from the state to the investor. Although the ccj's view of
the relationship between the parties does not create any difficulties in the cur-
rent dispute, problems could arise in other contexts, including with respect to
the timing of the perfection of the arbitration agreement and the form of the
acceptance of the offer to arbitrate. 8
Second, the ccj formulation ignores key analytical distinctions between
treaty-based and contract-based arbitration and brings investment arbitration
out of the realm of public international law and into the realm of private law.
While this move does not lead to any difficulties in the current dispute, it could
be problematic in other settings.'9
There is, of course, little or nothing that can be done about the langu-
age reflected in the current decision. However, parties and practitioners
may want to be aware of this issue if and when they rely on this case in the
future.
Understanding of Investment Arbitration
Although the ccj's use of contractual language may create some difficulties
going forward, the decision nevertheless demonstrates a relatively nuanced
understanding of investment arbitration. For example, the ccj recognizes that
"[t]he bilateral investment treaty was developed to remedy the vulnerability of
the foreign investor" and that "the success of the treaty regime depends upon
the acceptance and fulfilment by the host state of the legal obligations imposed
by the treaty" (para. 15). Furthermore, the ccJ notes that these obligations
18 Under standard analyses, the investor is the one to choose the time and manner of per-
fecting the arbitration agreement between the parties. Under the ccj approach, the state
would be in control of both those elements.
19 See S.1. Strong,'Discovery Under 28 u.s.c. §1782: Distinguishing International Commercial
Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration' (2013) 1 Stan.j. Complex Litigation
295, 322-372 (noting that the propriety of u.s. discovery requests in support of a "foreign
or international tribunal" might depend on the type of arbitration at issue).
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inure even if the host state has not enacted any statutes incorporating the
treaty into domestic law.2 0
The ccj also recognizes the broad powers of the arbitral tribunal. For exam-
ple, the decision notes that arbitrators have the ability to determine their own
jurisdiction under the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and to decide
whether to stay arbitral proceedings pending the outcome of any related
domestic actions (para. 23). The respect shown by the ccj to investment arbi-
tration is very encouraging, since it suggests that the court will adopt a pro-
arbitration stance in any future matters.
Like most judicial decisions, British Caribbean Bank Ltd v. The Government of
Belize is something of a mixed bag, with some elements that are good, some
that are bad, and some that fall somewhere in between. Given that Belize is not
currently a key arbitral jurisdiction and the ccj does not yet have the same
appellate scope as the Privy Council, any unfortunate features of the decision
are likely to fade with time.
However, if there is one broad lesson to be learned from British Caribbean
Bank, it is that common law courts are unlikely to deny themselves the ability
to enjoin international arbitration. A court may impose a number of restric-
tions on itself so as to limit the availability of anti-arbitration injunctions to
truly extreme situations, but it is highly unlikely that any court will ever rule
that it does not have jurisdiction to order this type of relief in appropriate cir-
cumstances. While this approach is somewhat unpredictable and potentially
open to abuse, the decision in British Caribbean Bank reinforces the extraordi-
nary nature of anti-arbitration injunctions. Given that such mechanisms are
likely to be a permanent feature on the contemporary litigation landscape, this
outcome is perhaps the best that opponents to anti-arbitration injunctions can
hope for.
20 See British Caribbean Bank, para. 19 (stating that "the notion that an unincorporated
treaty is incapable of conferring any rights on private entities in the municipal system has
been rejected. At a minimum they could yield legitimate expectations cognizable under
domestic law").
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